First-Person Perspective Effects on Theory of Mind without Self-Reference by Otsuka, Yuki et al.
First-Person Perspective Effects on Theory of Mind
without Self-Reference
Yuki Otsuka
1*, Naoyuki Osaka
1, Ken Yaoi
1, Mariko Osaka
2
1Department of Psychology, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan, 2Department of Psychology, Osaka University, Suita, Japan
Abstract
This study examined dissociations between brain networks involved in theory of mind, which is needed for guessing others’
mental states, and the self, which might constitute the basis for theory of mind’s development. We used event-related fMRI
to compare a condition that required participants to guess the mental state of a subject featured in first-person perspective
sentences (1stPP condition) with a third-person perspective sentence condition (3rdPP condition). The caudate nucleus was
marginally more activated in the 1stPP than in the 3rdPP condition, while the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was
significantly more activated in the 3rdPP condition as compared to the 1stPP condition. Furthermore, we examined the
correlation between activation (signal intensity) of the caudate nucleus and left DLPFC with that of the right DLPFC, which is
thought to be closely connected with sense of self. We found a significant correlation between caudate nucleus and right
DLPFC activation in the 1stPP condition, and between left and right DLPFC activation in the 3rdPP condition. Although
theory of mind and the self both appear to recruit the right DLPFC, this region seems to be accessed through the left DLPFC
during theory of mind tasks, but through the caudate nucleus when tasks require self reference.
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Introduction
When people communicate with one other, they are typically
aware of the presence of the other person’s mind, and are likely to
attempt to guess at the nature of the other person’s mental state. This
process is thought to require theory –of mind (ToM). Several studies
have recently investigated the neural basis of ToM [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Frith
a n dF r i t h[ 1 ]p r o p o s e dt h a tT o Ms e e m st ob em e d i a t e db yt h em e d i a l
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), including the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), temporal pole, and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS).
In addition to these brain areas, subsequent studies have indicated
that the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)
and anterior STS may also mediate ToM [3,5,7,8].
The concept of the ‘‘self’’ is likely relevant to revealing the neural
basis of ToM, given that ToM could not be acquired without prior
development of the self [9]. This idea is supported by the findings
that animals which display self-recognition (e.g., chimpanzees) pass
many tasksthat require ToM[10,11,12,13], and that humaninfants
seem to acquire ToM later than self-recognition [14,15]. If ToM
requires a developed sense of self as an initial basis, the neural basis
of ToM is likely to be based (at least in part) on the neural basis of
the self. Consistent with this view, some overlap in activation
(mainly in the MPFC) is typically observed during ToM tasks on the
one hand, and tasks that reference the self on the other [16,17].
The precise extent to which the neural bases of ToM and the self
overlap nevertheless remains up for debate. It was recently revealed
that the so-called ‘‘E-network’’ mediates various functions,
including sense of self, resting state, ToM, memory recall, and
reasoning[16]. The E-networkis an extensivecerebral network that
includes the MPFC, precuneus, TPJ and temporal pole. The E-
network may therefore serve as a common neural basis of ToM and
the self. This proposal suggests the possibility that developmental
processes that influence the E-network would also affect acquisition
of both ToM and the self. In contrast, there is a view that the right
PFC mediates sense of self, whereas ToM is mediated largely by the
left PFC [18,19,20]. This view is supported by the observation that
patients who sustained an injury to the right PFC show impairments
in autobiographical memory, whereas patients with left PFC
damage do not [21,22]. However, neuroimaging studies have
foundrightPFCactivationduringToMtasks[23].Keenanetal. [9]
suggested the possibility that self is a fundamental prerequisite for
the development of ToM. According to this view, the neural basis of
ToM and the self would overlap at the right PFC, but the two bases
would not show complete overlap.
As outlined above, there is no consensus regarding whether the
neural basis of ToM would overlap completely with that of the self,
although the issue is crucial for understanding the development of
ToM.Toexaminepossibledifferences inneuralbasisbetweenToM
and the self, we used a task that required participants to guess at the
mental state of an imaginary person featured in a short sentence
written from the 1
st person perspective, without the requirement of
self reference. The first-person-perspective (1stPP) pronoun ‘‘I’’ is
usually used in connection with oneself (particularly in writing and
talking). If a self-specific neural module exists in the brain, the 1stPP
would be quite likely to tap into such a neural basis, and to do so
more strongly than the third-person-perspective (3rdPP). The
present study used fMRI to examine brain activity during a
condition that required participants to guess about another’s mental
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subject (1stPP condition). This condition was compared to another
that required participants to guess at another’s mental state based
on sentences written from the 3rdPP (using the pronouns ‘‘he’’ and
‘‘she’’). We expected to observe different patterns of brain activity
across the 1stPP and 3rdPP conditions, if indeed ToM and the self
have separate neural bases. Furthermore, based on previous studies,
weexpectedthattherightPFCwouldshowhigheractivationduring
the 1stPP condition as compared to the 3rdPP condition, whereas
the left PFC should show the opposite pattern.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-two right-handed graduate and undergraduate students
from Kyoto University, Osaka University of Foreign Studies, and
Senri Kinran University (5 men and 17 women; mean age=22.3
years, range=19–29) participated in this study. All participants
gave their written informed consent before the experiment, which
was approved by the Ethics Committee of Advanced Telecom-
munications Research Institute International (ATR), Japan.
Administered Tasks
The time course of each trial was fixed at 20 s, with each trial
proceeding as follows. A start cue was initially presented for
500 ms and was followed by a sentence presented for 5200 ms, an
inter-stimuli-interval of 500 ms, and a second sentence presented
for 5200 ms. Immediately after the second sentence disappeared, a
cue requiring a response from the participant appeared. The cue
disappeared with the participant’s response (YES or NO), and a
blank screen appeared until the trial concluded.
We employed a task employed in previous studies [8,24] that
required participants to judge whether or not the second sentence
presented was contextually consistent with the first sentence, based on a
character’s mental state. The subject of the first sentence was ‘I’ in the
1stPP condition, while ‘‘he’’ or ‘‘she’’ was used in the 3rdPP condition.
Table 1 shows examples of the sentences used in the two conditions.
For our event-related design, we intermixed the stimuli from
each condition as follows. We first created four lists of 78 sentence
pairs, in which 18 different pairs were randomly assigned as 3rdPP
stimuli. Within each list, half of the stimuli were original pairs and
the remaining half constituted mixed pairs. Trial order was
randomized separately for each condition. Condition order was
pseudorandomized, with the constraint that not more than three
consecutive trials would appear in the same condition. The
experiment consisted of 78 trials in total.
fMRI data acquisition
A 1.5-T fMRI scanner (Shimadzu-Marconi Magnex Eclipse)
was used to acquire imaging data. Head movement was minimized
using a forehead strap and soft pads positioned under the head.
Twenty functional images with a thickness of 6 mm were acquired
using the following parameters: TR, 2000 ms; TE, 48 ms; flip
angle, 80u; FOV, 2566256 mm; and voxel size, 46466 mm.
Anatomical images were acquired after the experiment was
completed, using the following parameters: TR, 12 ms; TE,
4.5 ms; flip angle, 20u; FOV, 2566256 mm; and voxel size,
16161 mm. Stimuli were generated and synchronized using
Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, San Francisco,
CA). Subjects viewed the stimuli on a projection screen via a
mirror.
fMRI data analysis
Data were analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) in MATLAB (MathWorks,
Sherborn, MA). The first six images in the scan sequence were
excluded from analysis in order to rule out non-equilibrium effects
of magnetization, and the remaining 841 functional image
volumes were realigned to compensate for potential head
movement related signal declination. As one participant showed
head movements of .1 mm during the acquisition of functional
images, images from the remaining twenty-one participants were
analyzed. After realignment, the anatomical image was coregis-
tered to the first volume of functional images. Functional images
were then normalized with the anatomical image and spatially
smoothed using a Gaussian filter (7 mm full-width half-maximum).
Task-related activity was identified using the synthetic hemody-
namic response function provided by SPM. For the event-related
model, we time-locked the BOLD responses 9500 ms after the
onset of the first sentence, based on the findings of a previous study
[24]. Data were high-pass filtered with a frequency cut-off set at
32 s, the duration of the task alternation period, and low-pass
filtered using a hemodynamic response function. A random effects
model was applied, with a voxel-level threshold of p,0.001,
uncorrected for multiple comparisons. We applied an uncorrected
criterion because we focused on specific regions in which increased
activation has previously been reported during similar tasks [24].
After non-linear transformation (http://imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.
uk/imaging/MniTalairach), we used the brain atlas of Talairach
and Tournoux [25] to identify the activated anatomical regions.
Following identification of activated areas, percent signal
changes in regions of interest (ROI) were obtained using MarsBaR
[26]. We set ten brain areas as ROIs. These ROIs were selected
based on a group average of the statistical maps. Each ROI and
the center coordinate of spheres were set by intermediate local
maxima between 1stPP and 3rdPP in common regions, or local
maxima of each condition’s unique region as follows: The bilateral
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; 243, 11, 40; 49, 21, 30),
the bilateral IFG (251, 17, 20; 50, 20, 28), the ACC (28, 24, 38),
the left anterior STS (254, 8, 228), the left posterior STS (262,
240, 24), the left superior parietal lobule (SPL; 233, 265, 38),
the left TPJ (255, 254, 19), the thalamus (213, 212, 2), the
globus pallidus (222, 22, 24) and the caudate nucleus (CN; 212,
6, 10). ROIs were defined as spheres with radii of 3 mm, except
Table 1. Sentence examples for each condition.
1stPP 3rdPP
I prepared three alarms on the
bedside.
The National Center Test will begin at eight
tomorrow.
He wiped sweaty palms on his trousers. The final interview for new job will
begin soon.
I wiped sweaty palms on my
trousers.
The National Center Test will begin at eight
tomorrow.
She prepared three alarms on the bedside. The final interview for new job will
begin soon.
Abbreviations: 1stPP=first-person-perspective; 3rdPP=third-person-perspective.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019320.t001
Self and Caudate Nucleus
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e19320for subcortical areas (thalamus, globus pallidus and the CN), which
were defined as spheres with radii of 1 mm. We then used
STATISTICA statistical software (version 06J, StatSoft, Tulsa,
OK) to perform paired t-tests and correlational analyses of percent
signal change for each ROI.
Results
The behavioral data demonstrate high levels of response
accuracy (1stPP, Mean=90%, SD=6.1, range=75–98; 3rdPP,
Mean=86%, SD=8.9, range=67–100; t(20)=2.38; p,0.05).
Imaging data for all participants were therefore included in the
following analysis.
Table 2 shows the main activation areas for each contrast. To
examine signal intensity differences between the 1stPP and 3rdPP
conditions, paired t-tests were conducted on mean signal changes
for each ROI. Signal change in the left DLPFC was significantly
higher for the 3rdPP condition (0.3260.14%) than for the 1stPP
condition [0.2560.12; t(20)=2.38, p,0.05]. In the CN, we found
marginally higher signal change in the 1stPP condition
Table 2. Regions of activation during each condition.
Coordinates
Brain region activation Brodmann’s x y z T value Voxels
1stPP
middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) R9 44 22 32 4.86 1678
inferior frontal gyrus (VLPFC) R45 56 22 18 6.15
anterior cingulate cortex L32 28 26 38 6.7 1571
medial frontal gyrus R6 8 14 54 5.87
middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) L9 244 12 40 9.82 4031
inferior frontal gyrus (VLPFC) L45 252 18 18 8.41
posterior STS L21 260 232 285 . 0 8 1 8 8
superior parietal lobule L7 234 266 38 5.03 990
temporoparietal junction L22/39 254 254 20 6.16
inferior parietal lobule L7 232 256 42 5.97
fusiform gyrus L18 224 290 214 9.8 950
inferior occipital gyrus R18 26 296 266 . 6 7 4 0 4
thalamus 212 210 6 6.57 699
globus pallidus 222 22 24 6.44
caudate nucleus 212 6 10 5.28
3rdPP
middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) R9 54 20 28 6.13 830
inferior frontal gyrus (VLPFC) R45 54 24 24 5.29
anterior cingulate cortex L32 282 2 3 8 5 . 3 8 9 9 4
L32 210 10 42 6.14
superior frontal gyrus R8 4 26 48 8.29
middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) L9 242 10 40 10.6 2483
inferior frontal gyrus (VLPFC) L47 230 22 28 7.48
anterior STS L21 254 8 228 3.78
posterior STS L21 264 248 0 4.69 829
temporoparietal junction L22 256 254 18 6.33
fusiform gyrus R18 26 294 286 . 8 7 4 5 0
thalamus 210 210 4 5.56 172
1stPP-3rdPP
middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) R46 30 46 28 4.96 39
middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) L9 238 30 32 4.92 83
superior frontal gyrus L10 212 54 8 4.18 47
caudate nucleus 218 20 2 5.33 39
3rdPP-1stPP
no significant activation foci
Note: uncorrected P,.001.
Abbreviations: 1stPP=first-person-perspective; 3rdPP=third-person-perspective; L=left; R=right; DLPFC=dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; VLPFC=ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex; STS=superior temporal sulcus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019320.t002
Self and Caudate Nucleus
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t(20)=2.07, p=0.05]. Figure 1 displays the main activation areas
and mean signal changes for each condition in each ROI (Panels A
and B).
Discussion
The present study used fMRI to compare brain activity during a
condition that required participants to guess about another
person’s mental state on the basis of sentences written from the
1
st person perspective, with a similar task that involved sentences
written from the 3
rd person perspective. If a self-specific neural
basis (connected with the first-person-perspective, ‘‘I’’) is in fact
separate from the neural basis of ToM, different patterns of brain
activity across the 1stPP and 3rdPP conditions would be expected,
even without a clear self-reference requirement in the 1stPP
condition. Based on previous findings, we also expected that the
right PFC would show greater activation during the 1stPP
condition as compared to the 3rdPP condition, whereas left PFC
should show the opposite pattern. We found that signal intensity
for the CN was marginally higher during the 1stPP condition than
during the 3rdPP condition, whereas signal intensity for the left
DLPFC showed the opposite pattern.
We found that use of the 1
st person perspective had ToM-
related effects across our two conditions. This result seems to
indicate the presence of a self-specific neural basis (connected with
the first-person-perspective, ‘‘I’’) that is separate from the neural
basis of ToM. However, our results do not disconfirm the
hypothesis that both ToM and sense of self recruit the E-network,
which (as described earlier) consists of the MPFC (including ACC),
precuneus, TPJ and temporal pole [16]. The ACC and TPJ
showed no significant differences in signal intensity between the
1stPP and 3rdPP conditions, although we found significant
activation of these regions during each condition. The E-network
is probably shared by both ToM and the self, with further neural
bases specific to each occurring outside of the E-network. Possible
involvement of subcortical structures should receive greater
consideration with regards to sense of self, given that we found
self-related activity in the CN of the basal ganglia. Although this is
not conclusive evidence that the self serves as the basis for
Figure 1. Activation areas for each condition superimposed on a 3D rendering of the brain and horizontal slice (right, z=10). The
threshold for significant activation was p,0.001 uncorrected at the cluster level (Panel A). Mean signal changes for each condition are shown for each
region of interest (ROI). The yellow (left) bar indicates the first-person-perspective (1stPP) condition, and the green (right) bar indicates the third-
person-perspective (3rdPP) condition. Abbreviations: 1stPP=first-person perspective; 3rdPP=third-person perspective; DLPFC=dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex; IFG=inferior frontal gyrus; ACC=anterior cingulate cortex; aSTS=anterior superior temporal sulcus; pSTS=posterior superior
temporal sulcus; SPL=superior parietal lobule; TPJ=temporo-parietal junction; CN=caudate nucleus. *, p,.05; {, p,.10 (Panel B). Percent signal
change correlations between the left and right DLPFC (left panel), CN and left DLPFC (front panel), and right DLPFC and CN (right panel). Square
points indicate the 1stPP condition and triangle points indicate the 3rdPP condition (Panel C).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019320.g001
Self and Caudate Nucleus
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not require self-reference when guessing at another’s mental state)
may provide a clue: This effect indicates that ToM does not
perfectly modulate the experience of self.
One unexpected result was that the CN showed higher
activation during the 1stPP condition than during the 3rdPP
condition, instead of the right PFC as earlier work would suggest.
Previous studies have reported CN activation during subjective
decision-making involving self reference [27], and in self-serving
bias [28]. Blackwood et al. [28] proposed reward and implicit
learning as possible reasons for the CN activation observed. Self-
serving bias is quite likely to cause some form of internal reward, in
that positive events tend to be more internally attributed than
negative ones. However, it is difficult to envision how our
experiment might have caused such a reward effect, given that
we changed only the subject of the sentence across the 1stPP and
3rdPP conditions, without fundamentally changing sentence
meanings. It therefore seems reasonable to suppose that CN
activation would result from access to sense of self, formed via
implicit learning. This possibility is consistent with the observed
correlation between CN signal intensity and that for the right
DLPFC. It must of course be noted that our findings might also be
affected by our decision to examine implicit effects of the first-
person perspective. Further research on the relationship between
the CN and sense of self should help to clarify the neural basis of
the latter.
Higher activation of the left DLPFC during the 3rdPP condition
supports the view that left PFC activation during ToM tasks does
not result from use of a verbal strategy [8]. ToM tasks often allow
for the possibility that participants might have verbalized
information in their minds, even when non-verbal stimuli are
used. Accordingly, the issue of whether use of language causes the
overlap that is often found between language and ToM networks
has been discussed [29]. However, in the present study the same
verbal stimuli were used in both 1stPP and 3rdPP conditions,
except for the subject of the first sentence. The left DLPFC seems
to show ToM-specific activation, and not only because we
employed verbal stimuli.
Conclusion
We used fMRI to examine a dissociation of the brain networks
that underlie ToM and the self. Our findings showed that left
DLPFC activity is related to ToM, and that caudate nucleus
activity is related to sense of self.
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